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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The Utah Association for Justice ("UAJ") is a statewide organization comprised of 
attorneys committed to protecting the rights of persons who have been injured in their 
person or property, and who turn to the courts for judicial redress. In promoting these 
interests, UAJ seeks to preserve a fair, prompt, open and efficient administration of 
justice. 
UAJ members represent injured people in the vast majority of personal injury tort 
actions in this state. The Court's decision on what jury instructions are appropriate based 
on evidence of a tort victim having a preexisting condition that is symptomatic compared 
to a preexisting condition that is asymptomatic will impact virtually every one of those 
actions, as well as future personal injury litigation. Thus, the resolution of this case 
significantly impacts not only the parties to this action, but also thousands of tort victims 
throughout the state of Utah. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As amicus curiae, the Utah Association for Justice refers to the Standard of 
Review and Statement of the Case as set forth by Plaintiff/Respondent, and incorporates 
them as if set forth fully herein. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
This Court granted certiorari on the following issues: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding there was insufficient evidence to 
support an apportionment-to-preexisting -conditions jury instruction. 
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2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the apportionment instruction 
required evidence of a symptomatic preexisting condition on the "date of the 
accident." 
3. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the apportionment instruction 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
4. Whether Biswell v. Duncan, 743 P. 2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) states the correct legal 
standard. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UAJ's brief will not address the case-specific questions (one and three) but will 
only address the issues that have broader application (two and four). Biswell v. Duncan, 
743 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) states the correct legal standard as applied to 
asymptomatic plaintiffs.1 A defendant is liable for the entire harm caused to a plaintiff 
with an asymptomatic condition because, "but for" the tortfeasor's negligence, the 
plaintiff would not have had any pain or treatment due to the condition whatsoever. 
The Court of Appeals, in determining that Plaintiff Harris was not symptomatic on 
the "date of the accident" and therefore a jury instruction instructing the jury on 
symptomatic preexisting conditions was inappropriate, indicated that Harris' preexisting 
complaints were taken care of "by the time of the accident." The question of how long a 
plaintiff must be free from symptoms in order to declare a preexisting condition resolved 
or "taken care o f was not directly before the Court of Appeals in this case, as the 
uncontested evidence shows that Harris was asymptomatic for several years prior to the 
accident at issue. 
1. For purposes of this brief, the UAJ will refer to plaintiffs with latent, dormant or 
asymptomatic preexisting conditions (as opposed to preexisting injuries that caused pain 
or disability) at the time of the accident as "asymptomatic plaintiffs." 
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Whether a plaintiff has a preexisting condition that was asymptomatic versus 
symptomatic at the time of the injury-causing event should be determined in two stages. 
First, the trial court should make a pretrial determination of whether the defendant can 
present sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was symptomatic within a sufficiently close 
period of time prior to the injury-causing event. If the defendant does not have sufficient 
evidence to present that the plaintiff was symptomatic within a sufficiently close period 
of time prior to the injury-causing event, then introducing evidence of any prior accidents 
or preexisting conditions would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. If the trial court 
believes that the defendant has sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was symptomatic 
within a sufficiently close period of time prior to the injury-causing event, then the matter 
should go to the jury to decide whether the plaintiff was symptomatic prior to the 
accident. See Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., 939 P.2d 1213, 1220 n.5 (Utah App. 1997) 
(noting that both instructions for a symptomatic condition and an asymptomatic condition 
were given when the evidence was disputed as to whether plaintiffs condition was 
asymptomatic). 
ARGUMENT 
I. BlSWELL IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW AS APPLIED TO 
ASYMPTOMATIC PLAINTIFFS. 
This Court should clarify that while a jury must try to apportion an aggravation of 
a preexisting symptomatic condition, a tortfeasor is fully liable for all of the damages 
caused by an injury to a plaintiff with a preexisting asymptomatic condition. The 
asymptomatic/symptomatic distinction is found in Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, 
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If 15, 987 P.2d 588 and Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In 
Tingey, this Court held that "if the jury can find a reasonable basis for apportioning 
damages between a preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, it should do so; however, 
if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that the tortfeasor is 
liable for the entire amount of damages." Tingey, 1999 UT 68 at \ 15. While this Court 
did not expressly make a symptomatic/asymptomatic distinction in Tingey, the Court 
noted that the plaintiff was symptomatic at the time of the accident and was receiving 
ongoing pain management treatment for numerous injuries, including a visit less than a 
month before the crash to a pain clinic during which she complained of severe pain. In 
Biswell, the Court of Appeals addressed injuries to a plaintiff with a preexisting 
asymptomatic condition and held that when the tortfeasor's negligence causes an injury 
to a person with a preexisting asymptomatic condition or one to which the injured person 
is predisposed, "the defendant is liable to the injured person for the full amount of 
damages which ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or weakened condition." Biswell, 
742P.2dat88. 
The difference in the rules set forth in Tingey and Biswell is that Tingey applies to 
an aggravation of a symptomatic condition, while Biswell applies to a preexisting \ 
asymptomatic condition that is activated by the accident.2 Courts and commentators have 
2. It appears that ShopKo contends that Biswell is not a correct statement of the law 
because it removed "the aggravation element." {See Br. Pet'r 21-22.) Biswell is clear that 
liability is found only "when a defendant's negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, 
dormant, or asymptomatic condition." Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88 (emphasis added). This 
statement of the law is substantively identical to the rule in Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d 
451, 453 (Utah 1966) (holding plaintiff is entitled to recover damages "including any 
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noted the distinction between the application of the "eggshell plaintiff rule" to plaintiffs 
with a symptomatic preexisting condition and those with a dormant or latent condition. 
"[C]ourts note a distinction between an asymptomatic or latent condition—for which the 
defendant is entirely liable—and a preexisting symptomatic condition which requires 
apportionment, if possible." Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff: 
Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 749, 761 (2010); see also 2 
Jacob A Stein, Stein on Personal Injury Damages § 11:1 (3d ed. 1997) (noting the 
difference between the application of the eggshell plaintiff rule to plaintiffs with 
asymptomatic preexisting conditions and plaintiffs with preexisting conditions being 
actively treated at the time of the accident); Rachel V. Rose, et al., Another Crack in the 
Thin Skull Plaintiff Rule, 10 Tex. J. Women & L. 165, 182 (2011) (noting that the 
distinction between symptomatic and asymptomatic preexisting conditions is important 
because defendant is liable for all harm to a latent condition but only for the aggravation 
if the condition was symptomatic); Candice E. Renka, The Presumed Eggshell Plaintiff 
Rule: Determining Liability When Mental Harm Accompanies Physical Injury, 29 T. 
Jefferson L. Rev. 289,298 (2007) (noting that defendant is liable for any resulting harm 
if he activates a latent condition but only liable for the aggravation if the condition is 
symptomatic at the time of the accident). 
As noted by the Utah Court of Appeals, the distinction is found in the two 
different model jury instructions addressing preexisting conditions: (1) "aggravation of 
aggravation or lighting up of such a preexisting condition"), which ShopKo notes is the 
correct rule of law and contains "the core causal element." {See Br. Pet'r 21.) 
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symptomatic preexisting conditions" and (2) "dormant preexisting conditions." See 
Harris v. ShopKo Stores, Inc., 2011 UT App 329, \ 18, 263 P.3d 1184 (referencing MUJI 
2d CV2018 and CV2019). Other jurisdictions follow a similar approach when 
distinguishing between symptomatic and asymptomatic preexisting conditions. 
The Washington Supreme Court noted the symptomatic/asymptomatic distinction 
in Harris v. Drake, 99 P.3d 872 (Wash. 2004). With facts similar to this case, the court 
upheld a trial court's directed verdict for the plaintiff on causation when the defense 
failed to show that a preexisting condition was symptomatic "prior to the accident." Id. at 
878. The court explained that "when an accident lights up and makes active a preexisting 
condition that was dormant and asymptomatic immediately prior to the accident, the 
preexisting condition is not a proximate cause of the resulting damages'" Id. (emphasis 
added) (citing Bennett v. Messick, 457 P.2d 609, 612 (1969)).3 
The Iowa Supreme Court has also noted that the tortfeasor is liable for the full 
injury when the injury is superimposed upon an asymptomatic condition. In Sleeth v. 
Louvar, 659 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 2003), the court noted the conflict presented by the rule 
applicable to an aggravation of a symptomatic injury (as in Tingey) and the rule 
applicable to an injury involving an asymptomatic condition (as in Biswell). Id. at 211-12. 
The court characterized the two rules as (1) the aggravation rule and (2) the eggshell 
plaintiff rule. Id. The aggravation rule, it explained, applies when a preexisting condition 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals relied upon Bennett v. Messick in its opinion in 
Biswell See Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88. 
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was symptomatic and caused some sort of disability prior to the accident, and the 
eggshell plaintiff rule applied when the condition was asymptomatic. Id. 
In Sleeth, the plaintiff had asymptomatic arthritis in her knee when she was in a 
car crash and injured her knee. Id. at 211. Her friends, coworkers, and family testified 
that she had never complained of pain in her knee prior to the accident and that she was 
very active. Id. at 214-15. Over the plaintiffs objections, the trial court gave both the 
aggravation rule and the eggshell plaintiff rule to the jury. Id. at 212. As there "was no 
substantial evidence of preexisting disability" to the plaintiff at the time of the injury-
causing event, the court held that it was error to give the aggravation (Tingey) jury 
instruction and that the trial court should have only given the eggshell (Biswell) 
instruction. Id. at 216; see also Becker v. D&E Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 
1976) (holding that because a plaintiffs prior foot condition was "not disabling in any 
way" before the accident caused by the defendant, the defendant was liable for the full 
extent of those injuries). 
Several other jurisdictions have made similar conclusions. The Hawaii Supreme 
Court held that there should be no apportionment of damages if a person was fully 
recovered from a preexisting injury or condition at the time of an accident. "In such 
circumstances, [the tortfeasor] should be liable for the entire damages." Bachran v. 
Morishige, 469 P.2d 808, 811 (Hawaii 1970). The court distinguished the fully recovered 
plaintiff from one who was still experiencing pain or who was disabled from a prior 
injury at the time of an accident. If the plaintiff was still experiencing pain at the time of 
the accident, "then damages should be apportioned." Id. at 812. The Texas Supreme 
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Court held that an aggravation instruction (Tingey) should only be given if the plaintiff 
had a symptomatic preexisting condition before the crash and similar pain after the crash 
due to the injury, creating an intermingling of pain. See Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. 
O/r, 215 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex. 1948). The Arizona Supreme Court also held that it was 
not proper to give an aggravation instruction {Tingey) when the plaintiff had a dormant 
condition involving "an anatomically different spine than that of a 'normal' person." 
Scottsdale v. Kokaska, 495 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Ariz. 1972). Thus, courts of various 
jurisdictions have upheld the rationale supporting the sound ruling issued in BiswelL 
The Biswell rule is not only rationale and equitable, but it is also supported by 
sound public policy. Holding tortfeasors liable for the full damages suffered by an 
asymptomatic plaintiff is logical because, but for the tortfeasor's negligence, the 
asymptomatic plaintiff would not have had any pain and would not have been forced to 
seek medical treatment. In other words, in the absence of the tortfeasor's negligence, an 
asymptomatic plaintiff would not have experienced pain and suffering or incurred 
medical expenses at all.4 
Even though an asymptomatic plaintiff might have greater damages than a person 
without an asymptomatic preexisting condition, courts and commentators agree that the 
4. The Delaware Supreme Court explained that, under tort law, if a plaintiff had a 
preexisting disposition to a certain physical or emotional injury which had not manifested 
itself prior to the time of the accident, an injury attributable to the accident is 
compensable if the injury would not have occurred but for the accident. The accident 
need not be the sole cause or even the substantial cause of the injury. If the accident 
provides the "setting" or "trigger," causation is satisfied for purposes of compensability. 
Reese v. Home Budget Center, 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. 1993). 
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lojtL\isoi sinmilliII hi liable (HI flic lull ,11111 mil Hi Ihc <Inm.'ifM-.S Hie 111k "accords with 
society's general sense of justice that a tortfeasor should be liable irrespective of the 
unexpectedness of such harm," Richard A. Eptsein, Cases and Materials on 1oris 524 
(\ pic.ill or averape person would recover. For example, if a tortfeasor runs a red light and 
crashes into a persor. driving a $250,000 luxury vehicle and totals it, the plaintiff recovers 
$250,000, not thw vank o\ an average car. ( H, ii a torlleasm uyc ,1 icd li).iJli! a il entries 
into a physician v irho makes $250,000 pei ;; 'ear and the crash disables him, the physician 
recovers the amount of income he lost even though the average person's income is much 
less. See Schafe- v Hoffman, Ml !\2d 897, 902 iJ, ^ - ' ^ Mexiuuh.ing thai the 
" s h a b D y . •• .* • : ' * : • > ; : i ^ ' - n t 
i ; uaues), The same rule applies with injury claims: if a tortfeasor runs a red light and 
crashes into a vehicle occupied by a healthy college football linebacker and his 
grandmo..ici a^ U^KUJ; \na\c: •• * . c ..-J • \ 1 
his grandmothei v : 1 ildreco\ er all of her damages, even if the average damages incurred 
by a person in a car crash would be more than the football player's damages or less than 
his grandmother's damages. 
,\!Iuv\!!i!j a inn In iippnilinn nl.itiinces based nil .1 person's as^  niplomatic condition 
will lead juries to award less to the elderly and those with active jobs and lifestyles 
because these categories of plaintiffs are more likely to have degenerative conditions, 
mam ofuhn Ii ,111 a,v, mplniihilK 1 nt csiiinpk depener iliu thsc disease is a spinal 
condition caused by age and wear and tear that makes the discs between the vertebrae 
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more susceptible to injury. William C. Shiel, Jr., Degenerative Disc Disease and Sciatica, 
MedicineNet.com, http://medicinenet.com/degenerative_disc/article.htm (last visited May 
29, 2012). It should not be surprising that older people have more fragile spines and 
many will have discs that have started to degenerate due to age. Similarly, nurses, 
farmers, mechanics, and construction workers will have spines and joints that have begun 
to degenerate due to wear and tear from active physical jobs. Finally, those who maintain 
an active lifestyle such as campers, hikers, bikers, fisherman, runners, etc. will likely 
have more wear and tear on their joints due to their active lifestyle. Thus, the dormant 
"condition" that would be apportioned, absent Biswell, is the plaintiffs age, sex, 
occupation, or lifestyle. Apportioning damages in such a way would penalize people for 
simply growing old, choosing a certain job, or choosing an active lifestyle. The Biswell 
rule is not only the correct statement of the law, but also an equitable rule, as it holds the 
tortfeasor responsible for the damages that, but for his or her negligence, the plaintiff 
would not have suffered. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HARRIS WAS 
SUFFERING FROM A SYMPTOMATIC PREEXISTING CONDITION ON THE "DATE OF 
THE ACCIDENT" TO THE JURY. 
The Court of Appeals' decision indicated that a tortfeasor is liable for all damages 
caused to a plaintiff who has a dormant condition if the plaintiffs condition was 
asymptomatic on the date of the accident. See Harris, 2011 UT App 329 at f 22. After 
looking at the evidence marshaled by Harris and conducting its own review of the record, 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the uncontested evidence was that Harris5 
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court erred in submitting the issue of apportionment to the jury. Id at T)" 23. The Court of 
Appeals' decision was correct on. the merits and suggests the proper procedure for trial 
are symptomatic is in dispute. 
Before submitting the issue of apportionment to the jury, an initial determination 
must be made regarding whether there is sufficient e vddence that a plaintiff w as 
symptomatic at the time of, 01 IA 1.1:1 i.iii a si ifficiently close period of time prior to, the 
injury-causing event. In the present case, the Court of Appeals was easih able to make 
this determination as there was no evidence presenk u iim. * lurr. * niui sui;oreG ir.>m 
sy mptoms or . ' •.••...:••* - -;.\ * - i to tli, i 
accident. fhus, the Court of Appeals was not faced with the issue of determining whether 
a plaintiff s condition was symptomatic on the day of the accident since I larris was 
asymptomatic for 5^  ears prioi to the accident (-5 ee Respt' ' Br Opp. Cei I: at ] 3 11 4.) 
I 'i irther, the Utah Court of A ppeals approvingly cited to Ortiz v. Geneva Rock 
Prods., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. ! 997) and noted that Ortiz rejected plaintiffs claim 
that evidence of his preexisting conditions was irrelevant because there was some 
1 j ' " • ' * • - . »k H i - : t h e 
trial court's ruling admitting evidence of a preexisting condition because there was 
evidence presented by a doctor that the preexisting condition was not latent at the time of 
asymptomatic condition were given because there was conflicting evidence as to whether 
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plaintiffs condition was latent. Ortiz, 939 P.2d at 1220 n.5. The Court of Appeals' 
decision suggests that the jury should make the determination as to whether a condition 
was symptomatic or asymptomatic if there was some evidence that a condition was not 
latent during the time leading up to the accident. 
This approach is consistent with the law in other jurisdictions. In reviewing case 
law and authority from other jurisdictions, it does not appear that a bright-line test has 
been established indicating how long a plaintiff must be asymptomatic before a jury 
cannot reasonably conclude that the condition was symptomatic. Rather, it appears that 
this issue must be looked at on a case-by-case basis. In Hoskins v. Reich, the Washington 
Court of Appeals looked at whether the evidence showed that the plaintiff was 
symptomatic "immediately" before an accident. See Hoskins v. Reich, \1A P.3d 1250 
(Wash. App. 2008). The court held that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of pre-
accident conditions when plaintiff was asymptomatic for the "weeks and months 
immediately before this accident." Id. at 568. 
In approaching a case where there is a dispute as to the question of whether 
damages may be apportioned between the injuries caused by the tortfeasor and 
preexisting conditions, the trial court should exercise its gatekeeper function by 
determining whether evidence of preexisting conditions or a prior accident is relevant to a 
determination of whether the condition was symptomatic prior to the injury-causing 
event. If the evidence does not support a finding that a plaintiff was suffering from a 
symptomatic preexisting condition on the date of the accident, the trial court should 
exclude evidence of prior accidents (i.e. auto accidents, slip and falls, workers 
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because the evidence cannot support a finding that the condition was symptomatic. If a 
genuine dispute exists, then, like Ortiz, the jury can be given both the symptomatic and 
asymptoi natic instri ictions 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons 1//U respectfully requests ma: this "!ourt recognize 
ov.vv.t.. ana nngey both contain *;K ^orrc: icga. ;;iaiiuaid 
RESPECIFI II I 'i; SI JBMI1 ' I EDI his ; lsl da> c )f J- u i< \ 2C >1 2 
/S/ John P. Lowrance _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
John P. I .owrance 
UTAH ASSOCIATION FOR Jus'i ICE 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
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